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I operate a small fleet of Cessna aircraft that carry traffic
reporters for local radio stations. Just about a year ago on the
afternoon of Tuesday, June 10, 2003, one of my planes was headed west
over Interstate 66 in Manassas. The aircraft was operating under a TSA-issued
waiver, and it was in radio contact with controllers at Dulles Airport
and at a nearby approach-control facility in whose airspace it was
operating. In short, it was exactly where it was supposed to be, and it
was doing exactly what it was supposed to be doing.
However, some unnamed security official decided that my airplane
was a threat and dispatched a military jet from Andrews Air Force Base
to intercept it.
Air traffic controllers whose airspace the military plane passed
through were told that the jet was coming, but that was all. Nobody had
any idea whom or what the military jet was looking for, and its pilot
either did not have the capability or chose not to communicate directly
with the controllers. Thus, the jet was inside a heavily congested
airspace traveling at speeds of as much as 560 knots with controllers
and other aircraft relegated to the status of spectators.
It was only when this jet started circling our aircraft that we
figured out that he was looking for us. The jet circled us for several
minutes until the controller was able to get through to someone to call
him off. All this over a target moving away from the city on a route
flown four or five times a day by the same airplane.
This situation was somewhat worse than the similar case this month
because it disrupted airline traffic at two airports and because of the
hazards associated with a cat-and-mouse game that took place at a
relatively low altitude directly over a congested interstate highway.
But the core issues are exactly the same -- lack of coordination, common
sense and accountability.
In both cases, the aircraft in question were operating in an air
traffic control environment and in clearly defined airspace. A person
with even the most limited understanding of the area would have been
able to discern what control tower or approach controller was
responsible for the airspace in which the plane was located. A
reasonable reaction would have included a phone call to that facility or
controller to inquire about the status of the aircraft in question. In
both cases, that would have been the end of the issue.
However, both times the security people involved either were not
smart enough or chose not to make that phone call. Instead, intercepts
were initiated at great expense. At least in our case, that intercept
caused huge disruptions and safety problems.
I did my best to get to the root of the problem so that at least I
would have some assurance that it wouldn't happen again. I got nowhere.
From the outset, it seemed clear that the FAA didn't have a lot to do
with what happened and that the decisions that went wrong were made on
the security side.
I had been given a local number to call. I then was referred to a
military installation that turned out to be in Florida. From there I was
handed off to someone else. A number of the folks to whom I spoke
promised to have someone call back to help sort things out, but that
never happened. In the end, I was never able to pin down just who was
responsible or even where that person might have been located at the
time of the incident. What was doubly frustrating was the number of
military officials to whom I spoke along the way who didn't see a
problem with any of this.
We are now hearing that the air traffic controller involved in the
June 9 incident was dismissed, which I also find troubling. Are we to
understand that it is the controller's fault that the security people
didn't bother to pick up the phone and ask someone about this plane --
just as they didn't bother to do a year before on June 10, 2003? What's
wrong with this picture?
The air traffic control system was never intended as a security
device; it's there to help airplanes get from one place to the next
without bumping into one another in the air or on the ground. My
experience in almost a quarter-century of flying has been that it does a
good job. The controllers in our area, whose jobs have gotten incredibly
more complex since Sept. 11, 2001, are doing a terrific job under
difficult circumstances. My operation also deals on a daily basis with a
variety of aviation security folks, and they generally seem to be on top
of things and eager to make things work.
But, clearly, somewhere, there's a disconnect that can lead to
spectacular failures. Procedures need to be cleaned up, the lines of
communication clearly established, and some accountability and common
sense put in place.
Above all, the higher-ups at TSA and in the military have to
understand that they've got to change the way they do business.
Otherwise, it's only a matter of time before someone gets injured or
killed as a result of one of these foul-ups.
-- Stan Fetter
manages Hyde Field in Clinton.
© 2004 The Washington Post Company
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